The quiet architecture of the global internet has suddenly become a flashpoint for Southeast Asian diplomacy. On October 26, 2026, former Singaporean Member of Parliament Calvin Cheng ignited a regional debate by posting an infographic detailing Indonesia’s heavy reliance on Singaporean digital infrastructure, paired with the provocative, single-word question: “Potong?”—a Malay term meaning “to cut.” While Cheng quickly walked back the implication, asserting that Singapore is a law-abiding nation that would not disrupt connectivity, the remark hit a raw nerve in Jakarta, coming amid escalating tensions over regional environmental and energy policies.
From Smog to Submarine Cables
The digital friction follows a period of cooling relations between the two neighbors. As persistent forest and peatland fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan have blanketed Singapore and Malaysia in hazardous smoke, Singaporean authorities have issued legal notices to 10 Indonesian companies suspected of involvement. The situation intensified on October 21, when President Prabowo Subianto used a plenary cabinet session to emphasize the protection of natural resources. Shortly after, Minister Bahlil Lahadalia indicated that Indonesia would evaluate energy export contracts, signaling a willingness to halt supplies to nations that do not “respect” Indonesia.
By October 24, those words manifested in policy: state-run SKK Migas reduced gas exports to Singapore by 31 million standard cubic feet per day. While the official justification cited domestic electricity needs in Batam, Bintan, and Sumatra, the timing was impossible to ignore. Though the volume of the cut—estimated at roughly 2 to 14 percent of Singapore’s daily needs depending on the reporting metric—is relatively small, it serves as a potent geopolitical signal. The move mirrors a 2011 dispute where Jakarta threatened similar energy restrictions before ultimately opting for a shift in supply sources.
The Reality of Digital Asymmetry
The core of the current anxiety lies in a stark statistical reality: Indonesia is profoundly dependent on its neighbor for its digital lifeblood. According to data provided in June 2026 by Denny Setiawan, the Director of Digital Infrastructure Strategy and Policy at Indonesia’s Komdigi, 90 percent of the country’s internet traffic flows through Singapore. Research from the GeoCables platform suggests that all 72 of Indonesia’s submarine cables connect to the island state. This arrangement is largely a product of market forces—proximity, mature data centers, and lower transit costs—rather than deliberate strategic capture by Singapore.
However, the concept of “weaponized interdependence” provides a framework for understanding why this is now a national security concern. For a state to effectively use infrastructure as a bargaining chip, it must have the desire, the legal jurisdiction, and a lack of alternatives for the target nation. While the landing stations are physically located in Singapore, the economic and reputational risks to the island nation for disrupting regional connectivity would be immense. As Meutya Hafid, Indonesia’s Minister of Communication and Information Technology, has pointed out, a total disconnection would also cripple 80 percent of Singapore’s own connectivity, creating a mutual hostage situation.
Legal Safeguards and Structural Vulnerabilities
Relying on international law to resolve a potential digital blockade is complicated. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides robust protections for submarine cables against physical damage at sea, such as those caused by ship anchors or natural disasters. These provisions, however, were not designed to regulate a nation’s decision to throttle or cut data flow at a landing station within its sovereign territory. While Article 113 mandates that countries punish cable damage, it offers little recourse for a diplomatic decision to block traffic.
“The ability to disrupt and the intent to do so must be assessed separately,” note observers familiar with the regional digital architecture. Dependency, in this case, acts as a latent vulnerability rather than an immediate, active threat.
The path forward for Indonesia involves diversifying its digital gateways. The Komdigi roadmap aims to establish new international connection points, such as a gateway in Manado, to bypass the Singaporean hub entirely. Furthermore, the country is looking to integrate low-Earth orbit satellites and microwave networks as fail-safes for essential services like national payment systems and disaster command centers. These backups are not replacements for the high-capacity submarine cables, but they provide a necessary buffer against total isolation.
Learning from Global Precedents
Indonesia is not alone in grappling with these risks. When cables connecting Taiwan’s Matsu Islands were severed in 2023, the region was forced to rely on limited microwave capacity for nearly a month, demonstrating how slow recovery times can be as disruptive as the initial break. To mitigate such risks, the European Union has begun funding regional cable hubs and repair funds to coordinate responses to infrastructure failures. A similar ASEAN-wide framework, featuring expedited permits for repair vessels and transparent information sharing, could help move the issue of cable security away from the theater of political retribution.
As 2028 approaches—the year many of the current energy pipeline contracts are set to expire—the pressure to de-link environmental, energy, and digital policy will only increase. For now, the “cable issue” remains a hypothetical risk, but the diplomatic ripples caused by a single, offhand question have already prompted a serious reevaluation of how much, and how quickly, a nation can insulate its digital future from its neighbors’ political whims.
